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By Democratic Audit
Denying prisoners the vote creates a barrier to their
reintegration into society
Parliament is currently considering how to relax the UK’s restrictions on prisoner voting, which have been
deemed in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. In this post Nicola Lacey argues that our
ongoing failure to extend voting rights to prisoners creates a powerful symbol of their exclusion from full
membership of society.
Over the last
several
months, a
parliamentary Joint  Committee has been hearing evidence on the Draf t Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill. 
The Bill is a (tardy) response to the judgment of  the European Court of  Human Rights’ in Hirst v UK  (2005),
which held that  this country’s provision that prisoners (other than those on remand or serving sentences
f or contempt of  court) lose the vote while serving their sentence is in breach of  Article 3 of  Protocol 1 of
the European Convention.  The Bill sets out three options: extension of  the f ranchise to prisoners serving
a sentence of  less than 4 years; extension of  the f ranchise to prisoners serving 6 months or less; and a
restatement of  the existing law.
The question of  prisoners’ eligibility to vote poses a very real challenge f or legislators given the mismatch
between the apparent strength of  public f eeling against extending the f ranchise and the European Court of
Human  Rights’ statement of  this country’s international  obligations.  As a criminal justice scholar rather
than a human rights lawyer, my evidence to the Committee concentrated on the case f or allowing prisoners
to vote rather than on that of  the best interpretation of  our obligations under the European Convention.  In
response to the Committee’s concerns about national sovereignty, however, I  noted that, given the
emphasis in both Hirst and, particularly, later cases such as Scoppola v Italy (2012) on the margin of
appreciation remaining to this country in determining how to meet its Convention obligations, there is lit t le
reason to think that the European Court of  Human Rights has overstepped its proper role.
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I argued that there is a strong case f or f ollowing the example of
many of  our European neighbours, and of  several Commonwealth
countries, in extending the vote to the vast majority of  prisoners.  My
reason f or holding this view is that the denial of  the f ranchise is a
powerf ul symbol of  the exclusion of  of f enders f rom f ull membership
of  society, and that the knock-on ef f ects of  this sort of  exclusion is
one of  the main barriers to the successf ul reintegration of  ex-
of f enders into society f ollowing release.  Whether or not there is
evidence that voting contributes to rehabilitation and reintegration,
there is reason to avoid f raming our criminal punishments in such a
way as to f oster the stigmatisation of  of f enders.  For stigmatisation
which impedes later reintegration implies signif icant costs not only
f or f ormer of f enders but f or potential victims of  crime – in other
words, f or all of  us.
One usef ul way of  looking at the issue is to ask ourselves which group of  countries we would like to
belong to: the Commonwealth countries like Canada and Australia, which have rejected the argument that
criminal conviction per se f orf eits the right to vote, along with European and Nordic countries like  Denmark,
Ireland, Finland, Spain, Sweden and  Switzerland, or France and Germany, which remove the vote only under
very restricted circumstances, and only at the sentencing stage; or with Russia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Estonia
and Hungary, which impose blanket bans on prisoner voting.  It is worth noting that the two groups
represent not only very dif f erent tradit ions in terms of  human rights compliance, but also systematic
dif f erences in criminal justice, with the Nordic and north European countries in particular combining prisoner
voting with signif icantly lower levels of  punishment than we have come to expect in this country, while
enjoying similar or lower levels of  crime.
There are two ways in which an argument justif ying prisoner disenf ranchisement might be f ramed.
The f irst argues that disenf ranchisement is an appropriate part of  the relevant punishment f or particular
(or all) of f ences: someone who commits a criminal of f ence – or one of  a particular quality, or degree of
seriousness – should f orf eit their f ull civil rights because of  a violation of  the social contract, returning to
f ull membership of  the community only when the f ull term of  punishment has been served.  This argument
has a certain intuit ive plausibility.  But it does not explain why it should be only prisoners, rather than all
of f enders, who f orf eit the vote.  And it has balef ul practical side-ef f ects.  As several witnesses pointed
out, one of  the implications of  applying disenf ranchisement to prisoners is that it removes f rom the
electorate a disproportionately high number of  certain ethnic groups, notably black men. And when we take
into account that the prison population as a whole represents a very skewed demographic – and in
particular represents the most disadvantaged sector of  the of f ending population, as judged in terms of
f actors like poverty, poor education,  homelessness, mental health problems and the experience of  abuse
or neglect in childhood – it f ollows that the disenf ranchisement of  prisoners, overall, serves to exacerbate
what is already a sense in which many prisoners are socially disenf ranchised at the time of  their of f ences.
This is not to take away f rom their responsibility f or their of f ences: it is not to deny the harm and suf f ering
which they may cause, and the distress of  their victims; nor is it to deny the justice of  holding them to
account. But, in deciding how to respond to those of f ences, those demographics should nonetheless be
taken into account. They may explain, f or example, the indif f erence to the vote which persists among many
prisoners.  But this is not a reason to think that depriving them of  the vote doesn’t matter. On the contrary,
it underlines the huge challenge which we f ace in integrating and including many of f enders within society. 
To continue with disenf ranchisement, in other words, amounts to giving up on the project of  social
inclusion, and to risk a drif t towards ever greater polarisation and alienation. We have only to look at the
USA – where an extensive, if  uneven, practice of  prisoner and indeed f elon disenf ranchisement has been
practised f or many years – to see the costly and divisive consequences of  such a system. By contrast, if
we look at our European and Nordic neighbours who allow most prisoners the vote, we also see countries
with signif icantly more moderated penal systems and with better outcomes across a range of  social
indicators including equality and literacy.
The second argument f or depriving prisoners of  the vote suggests that the circumstances of  incarceration
are such as to take the vote away by necessary implication.  The f act that remand prisoners and those
imprisoned f or contempt already vote makes this a hard argument to sustain on any practical level.  It has
been argued, though, that the circumstances of  dependence on the executive, and the restricted
association and movement implicit in imprisonment, are such that prisoners are unable to participate in the
practices of  civic involvement which ideally underpin the vision of  cit izenship which f inds its ult imate
expression in the casting of  a vote (see Peter Ramsay’s ‘Faking Democracy with Prisoners’ Voting Rights’ ).
This argument deserves to be taken seriously, but I would reject it f or two reasons. The f irst is that the
majority of  prisoners are incarcerated f or less than the length of  a f ull parliament, and are hence able to
exercise their f ull rights of  polit ical participation f or much of  that period.  Disqualif ication theref ore
produces arbitrary results: it can have a dif f erent impact on people with identical sentences.  The second is
that prisoners retain access to news media and to means of  communication both within the prison and,
albeit subject to some restrictions, with those outside, and are theref ore capable of  continuing their lives
as cit izens albeit within a somewhat restricted context.  Prisons can be, and sometimes are, places where
vigorous polit ical debate goes f orward.  To claim that this does not qualif y as a f orm of  civic engagement is
a throwback to the pre-modern – and in my view inappropriate – idea that prisoners suf f er a f orm of  ‘civic
death’.
We of  course hope that most criminal of f ences on the statute book def ine serious harms and wrongs f or
which punishment is appropriate.  But it is perhaps worth reminding ourselves that, less than 50 years ago,
various f orms of  sexual conduct which we today regard as legit imate were criminalised.  The idea that, say,
a man imprisoned f or what was then the of f ence of  having sex with another man should have been
deprived of  any polit ical voice in the run-up to the enactment of  the Sexual Of f ences Act 1967 seems
repugnant.  If  we believe in the robustness of  our criminal law, we should have the conf idence to allow
those who may disagree with us to participate, polit ically, even if  we retain our right to punish them where
their disagreement takes the f orm of  breaching the law.
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